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INTRODUCTION 
The parties have extensively briefed the issues in this matter. The issues on 
appeal are clear. The Harveys seek a determination by the court of whether or not 
there is a material difference between the 2001 and 2003 disconnection statutes 
with respect to the dispositive issue of islands of unincorporated territory between 
cities. If the court determines that the two versions of the statutes are materially 
different, the appellants seek a determination as to which version of the 
disconnection statute should apply in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
The parties agree that Judge Taylor ruled that the 2001 and 2003 
disconnection statutes are substantively identical with respect to the treatment of 
islands. However, this ruling was clearly in error. As the parties have outlined in 
their previously filed briefs, there are numerous and substantive differences 
between the two versions of the statute. The plain language of the 2001 
disconnection statute prohibits only islands that lie "within or project into the 
boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2)(i) (2001). 
The parcel that is subject to disconnection in this matter would create neither 
a prohibited island nor a prohibited peninsula under section 10-2-503 (2)(i). See 
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Brief of the Appellants at 10-13; Reply Brief of the Appellants at 3-4. In 
determining that the statutes were identical, the trial court avoided having to make 
the determination as to the retroactive application of the 2003 statute. Because the 
2001 and 2003 disconnection statutes are clearly not substantively identical, this 
court must determine whether or not the 2003 statute should be applied 
retroactively. The determination of which statute should apply is one of the issues 
on appeal. 
A. The Plain Language of the 2001 Disconnection Statute is 
Unambiguous and Does Not Prohibit the Harveys* Disconnection 
Ultimately, this appeal is based primarily upon this court's interpretation of 
the language of Utah Code § 10-2-503(2001). The text of this section reads 
{emphasis added): 
10-2-503 Criteria for disconnection. 
(l)The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will 
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for 
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services 
would materially increase over previous years or for which it would 
become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a 
municipality. 
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all 
relevant factors including the effect of disconnection on: 
(a) the city or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
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(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; 
(h) other municipal services; and 
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped 
peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of 
the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected. 
Cedar Hills asserts that the language in subsection (2)(i) should be 
interpreted to say: "If an island is created, this criteria, by itself, requires the 
dismissal of a disconnection petition." See Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 4. 
While this interpretation of the language in this subsection is creative, there is 
absolutely no support for it. The fact that peninsulas are prohibited if they are both 
"unreasonably large or [of] varied-shaped" and "project into the boundaries of the 
municipality" does not mean that the creation of an island automatically requires 
dismissal. Despite the constant reiteration of this argument by the appellees and 
the fact that the trial court ruled in favor of this position, the reasoning behind it is 
faulty. 
Cedar Hills also implies that the final phrase of subsection 2(i) ("result 
within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is 
to be disconnected") pertains only to the peninsulas discussed in this subsection. 
However, this argument fails to consider the plain language of the statute. If that 
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had been the intent of the drafters, they would have separately enumerated the 
requirement that islands are prohibited. 
The grammatical construction of part (i) indicates that both "islands" and 
"unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses" are intended to serve 
as subjects to to the verb "result." To determine otherwise would not make sense 
grammatically. Cedar Hills1 interpretation implies to the court that the intent of the 
drafters was to say: "In making that determination, the commissioners shall 
consider all relevant factors including the effect of disconnection on... whether or 
not islands." This is not a complete sentence, nor does it make any sense. In 
asking the court to rule that the 2001 and 2003 statutes are identical, Cedar Hills is 
requesting that the court ignore the plain, unambiguous meaning of the 2001 
statute. 
To the contrary, the interpretation presented by the Harveys makes complete 
sense based on the plain language. Under this interpretation, the statutory 
provision with respect to "islands" states: "In making that determination, the 
commissioners shall consider all relevant factors including the effect of 
disconnection on... whether or not islands... result within or project into the 
boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected." 
This is a complete sentence with unambiguous meaning. There is no basis for 
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reading this statute any other way. There is no need to go beyond the plain 
language of the statute because the meaning is not ambiguous. 
Under the Harveys* interpretation, islands within the municipal boundaries 
or projecting into the municipal boundaries are prohibited. This is consistent with 
the public policy reasons behind the disconnection statutes as discussed throughout 
the briefing. See Brief of the Appellants at 10-15; Reply Brief of the Appellants at 
10. 
The parcel at issue in this case neither projects into the municipal boundaries 
nor is it completely surrounded by the municipality. Therefore, subsection (2)(i) is 
inapplicable to this case. 
B. The Harveys Have a Vested Right to Have the 2001 Statute 
Applied 
The Harveys have a vested right in bringing a disconnection action based on 
the law applicable at the time their action was filed. The appellees correctly state 
that "no one has a vested right in any rule of law." See Supplemental Brief of the 
Appellees at 7 citing Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 675 
(Utah 1985). However, the court in Berry continues to state that: "once a cause of 
action under a particular rule of law accrues to a person by virtue of an injury to his 
rights, that person's interest in the cause of action and the law which is the basis for 
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a legal action becomes vested, and a legislative repeal of the law cannot 
constitutionally divest the injured person of the right to litigate the cause of action 
to a judgment." Id, At 676. 
The Harveys do not claim to have a vested right in prevailing on this claim. 
They have never requested that this court rule in favor of their disconnection 
petition. Rather, they have a vested right in having the appropriate statutory 
standard apply in this case. The amendments in this case do not merely "clarify" 
or "amplify" how the earlier law should have been understood. They alter the 
substantive law governing disconnection by creating new factors the district court 
must consider in making its decision. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory 
from Highland City, 668 P.2d 554, 549 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
As stated throughout the briefing, the two versions of the disconnection 
statutes are not substantively identical. On the dispositive matter in this appeal, the 
creation of an island of unincorporated territory, the 2001 and 2003 statutes are 
opposite in their effect. The Harveys want an opportunity to avail themselves of 
their vested right to present evidence of the viability of their disconnection and 
have it analyzed under the 2001 disconnection statute. Therefore, the Harveys 
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respectfully request the court to REVERSE the District Court decision and 
REMAND the case to the District Court for the presentation of evidence on the 
viability of disconnection. 
DATED this yfe> day of June 2009. 
DUVAL & MOODY, P.C. 
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